Data readme file
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Title: "Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences"
Journal: "Management Science"
Year: 2014
Author: Zachary Grossman (UC Santa Barbara) grossman@econ.ucsb.edu

Data file:  stratig_final.dta (stata dataset)
Analysis code file:  stratig_analysis.do (stata .do file)

List of variables with descriptions:
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sessionid: Z-tree timestamp of session
profit: participant's final payoff
id: ID number used for payment
dictator: 1 = dictator; 0 = recipient
group: used to match dictator/recipient pairs
condition: Default NR = 9; Active Choice = 1; Default R = 7; Strategy Method = 3; Baseline = 6; Default NR (previous version, without 2-screen choice elicitation) = 0
version: 0 = conflicting-insterests game, 1 = aligned-interests game
conf_choice: used in Strategy Method condition to record contingent choices
aligned_choice: used in Strategy Method condition to record contingent choices
reveal: 0 = didn't reveal; 1 = did reveal
choice: 0 = A; 1 = B
r_conf_choice:  used for recipients' hypothetical choices to record contingent choices
r_aligned_choice:  used for recipients' hypothetical choices to record contingent choices
belief_b: stated belief about perc_B (if R) or pred_perc_B (if D)
belief_reveal: stated belief about perc_reveal (if R) or pred_perc_reveal (if D)
perc_b: percentage of dictators in that session who know they are in CI game who choose B (5,5)
pred_perc_b: average amount predicted by recipients in that session
perc_reveal: fraction of dictators choosing reveal in that session
pred_perc_reveal: the average amount predicted by recipients in that session for the fraction of dictators revealing in that session

Sample sizes were determined so as to yield sufficient power.
